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Abstract. Peer review lies at the core of current scientific research. It
is composed of a set of social norms, practices and processes that con-
nect the abstract scientific method with the society of people that apply
the method. As a social construct, peer review should be understood by
building theory-informed models and comparing them with data collec-
tion. Both these activities are evolving in the era of automated com-
putation and communication: new modeling tools and large bodies of
data become available to the interested scholar. In this paper, starting
from abstract principles, we develop and present a model of the peer
review process. We also propose a working implementation of a subset of
the general model, developed with Jason, a framework that implements
the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model for multi agent systems. After
running a set of simulations, varying the initial distribution of reviewer
skill, we compare the aggregates that our simplified model produces with
recent findings, showing how for some parameter choice the model can
generate data in qualitative agreement with measures.
1 Introduction
Science is both a method - a logically coherent set of norms and processes -
and a social activity, in which people and organizations endeavour to apply the
method. One of the most important elements of the social structure of science is
peer review, the process that scrutinizes scientific contributions before they are
made available to the community.
As with any social process, peer review should be the object of scientific inves-
tigation, and should be evaluated with respect to a set of parameters. Common
sense would suggest, at least, considerations of fairness and efficiency. In addi-
tion, two specific dimensions very relevant to research are innovation promotion
and fraud detection. Science evolves by revolutions [6], and peer review should
be evaluated with respect to its reaction to novelty. Is the current system of peer
review supporting radical innovation, or is it impeding it?
2Fraud detection, especially for politically relevant matters as medicine and
health, is also extremely important; its actual effectiveness at ensuring quality
has yet to be fully investigated. In [7], the review process is found to include a
strong “lottery” component, independent of editor and referee integrity. While
the multiple review approach to a decision between two options is supported by
Condorcet’s jury theorem, if we move beyond simple accept/reject decisions by
considering scoring and ranking, we find several kinds of potential failures that
are not waived by the theorem.
These questions are particularly relevant right now, because, on the one hand,
peer review is ready to take advantage of the new information publishing ap-
proach created by Web 2.0 and beyond. On the other hand, we perceive a diffuse
dissatisfaction of scientists towards the current mechanisms of peer review. This
is sometimes testified just anecdotally; list of famous papers that were initially
rejected and striking fraudulent cases abound. Leaning on examples is an ap-
proach that we do not support because it is known to induce bias [13]. However,
some recent papers have shown some numerical evidence on the failures of peer
review [4].
In fact, peer review is just a specific case of mutual scoring. Following [9, 10],
it is a reciprocal and symmetric type of evaluation which includes narrow access
and transparency to the target (at least this is how it is designed in the case of
teamwork, see the example of scientific research evaluation). Peer review is the
standard that journals and granting agencies use to ensure the scientific quality
of their publications and funded projects.
The question that follows is then - can we improve on this process? We are
not going to fall for the technology trap, and just suggest that by updating
peer review to the Web X.0 filtering, tagging, crowdsourcing, and reputation
management practices [10], every problem will disappear - in fact, change could
make the problems worse; consider for example the well known averaging effect
of searching and crowd filtering [3].
Instead, we propose to create a model (or better, a plurality of models) of peer
review, that takes into account recent theoretical developments in recommender
systems and reputation theories, and test “in silico” the proposed innovations. In
this work, we draw an overview of how we foresee such a model, and we present a
first, partial implementation of it. Although the literature of simulation models
about peer review is scarce, we highlight the results presented in [12], where the
authors focus on an optimizing view of the reviewer for his or her own advantage,
and those of [8], aimed at encouraging “good” research behaviour by means of
the OpinioNet reputation model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines a
general model of peer review as well as a restricted model focusing on the roles
of the reviewer and the conference. Section 3 explains how the latter has been
implemented as a Multi-Agent System (MAS) over Jason [2]. In section 4 we show
the aggregates that our simplified model produces when varying the distribution
of reviewers’ ability. Finally, in section 5 we state the conclusions of this work
and discuss about future lines of research.
32 Description of the proposed model
In this section, we draw the outline of a model of peer review (PR-M in the
following) and of its subset that we have implemented. We use agent-based
simulation as a modelling technique [1]. With respect to statistical techniques
employed for example in [4] or [7], the agent-based or individual-based approach
allows us to model the process explicitly. In addition, it helps focusing on agents,
their interaction, and possibly also their special roles - consider for example the
proposal in [7] of increasing pre-screening of editors or editorial boards. Such a
change is based on trust in the fair performance of a few individuals who take up
the editors role. Thus, these individuals deserve detailed modeling, that could
allow us to reason on their goals and motivations [5].
In this model, we want to catch the whole social process of review, and not
just the workings of the single selection process. We will try to simulate the whole
lifecycle of peer review, that will allow for example - in the complete model -
to reason about role superposition between author and reviewer. This approach
distinguishes our effort from that of other authors like [4].
2.1 PR-M
The key entities in our system are: the paper, as the basic unit of evaluation; the
author of the paper; and the reviewer, which participate in a program committee
of a specific conference. We define them in the following paragraphs.
Paper. Here, we do not focus on research but on its evaluation. We assume that
the actual value of a paper - that we take as the basic research brick - is difficult
to ascertain. While we are aware that this is a strong simplification, we give to
each paper a numerical value3, we speculate that the value is only accessible
through a procedure that implies the possibility of mistakes.
As a consequence, value is hidden by noise and evaluating papers is modeled
as a difficult task - though, noise can obviously be canceled by repeated inde-
pendent evaluations. In our model, we give papers an intrinsic fixed value. But
there is another, different value that can be calculated and that changes in time:
the number of citations that the paper receives.
The value of a paper as the number of its citation should, in an ideal case,
reflect its actual value. In PR-M, we plan to implement a citation system so
that approved papers can be cited by other papers, thus creating a network of
citations. The decision process will be carried on by the simulated author. With
both an intrinsic value and a citation count, after an initial bootstrapping phase,
we could check the correlation between these two. The larger the correlation, the
better the whole system of peer review is performing.
3 How to modify this assumption is an interesting research question. We can imagine
creating a vector of quality dimensions as presentation, technical quality, and inno-
vation; and also removing the assumption completely - to a point in which we could
say that papers do not exist, but only their interpretation. As a first attempt, and
to provide a reference, using a single value seems to be the obvious choice.
4Author. Authors create papers and submit them to the conferences. With the
citation network, the author will also decide on what papers are to be included
in the bibliography. We plan to develop a probabilistic choice where a paper will
have a higher chance to be cited depending on a list of factors including paper
presence in a conference where the author is in the PC, or has submitted a paper;
being co-authored by the author himself; and being a highly cited paper, thus
mirroring the positive feedback mechanism that operates in research. Authors
could have individual preferences on the weights. By varying the distribution of
the intrinsic value of the papers submitted as well as the author preferences, the
PR-M model will allow us to analyze the evolution of the quality of the papers
published by each conference.
Reviewer. Reviewers can be part of the program committee (PC) of any number
of conferences. In every simulation cycle, representing one year or conference
edition, they evaluate a certain number of papers for each conference that enlists
them in the PC.
The PR-M model characterizes reviewers by a probability value, named re-
viewer skill (s), that represents the chance they actually understand the paper
they are reviewing.
The distribution of s values is the primary cause of reviewing noise. We
will experiment with several distributions, including a uniform distribution of s
values across reviewers (which we consider a low level of noise in evaluations)
and other, left-skewed distributions where a low level of reviewing skill is more
frequent.
Conference. As with the paper, we use the term conference in a general sense;
it covers also, for example, the journal selection process. The authors’ decision
about what conference to send their works to is crucial, since the number of
papers received is a measure of success for the conference, and their quality
will determine the conference’s quality. Can the review-conference system en-
sure quality in the face of very strong noise, variable reviewers skill, thanks to
some selection process of PC composition that leans on the simplest measurable
quantity - disagreement? The number of evaluations a paper receives are just a
few - three being a typical case. Thus, the conference is where all the process
comes together - are three reviews enough to cancel noise? For what distributions
of papers and reviewers skill?
2.2 PR-1
In this paper, we only present a restricted implementation of the full model. This
restricted model, that we call PR-1, contains a subset of the features in PR-M,
focusing on the roles of the reviewer and the conference only. Thus, the authors
and the papers are not included in the following PR-1 definition.
PR-1 represents the peer review problem by a tuple 〈R,C〉, where R is the
set of reviewers participating in the PC of a set of conferences C.
5Each reviewer r ∈ R has an associated skill value s ∈ [0, 1]. The result of
reviewing is accurate with probability s, and completely random with probability
(1 − s). To test different distributions in the unit segment, we use the beta
distribution. Depending on its two parameters (see figure 1), this distribution
can easily express very diverse shapes such as: a uniform skill distribution (α =
1, β = 1); a set of moderately low skill reviewers (α = 2, β = 4), and a mix of
very good and very bad reviewers (α = 0.4, β = 0.4).
Fig. 1. Beta distributions used in the paper. From left to right, values for (α, β): (2,4)
corresponding to low skill reviewers, (0.4, 0.4) corresponding to a mix of very good and
very bad reviewers. The uniform distribution, also used in the paper, is not shown.
Conferences c ∈ C are represented by the tuple:
c = 〈np, rp, pr,Rc, pa, ac, I, d, e〉
Each conference receives a number of papers np every year, and employs a
subset of reviewers Rc ⊆ R to prepare rp reviews for each paper. The size of the
PC (|Rc|) depends on the number of reviews done per PC member pr.
Papers have an associated value representing their intrinsic value, and receive
a review value from each reviewer. The intrinsic values follow a uniform distri-
bution over a N -values ordered scale, interpretable as the standard from strong
reject to strong accept scores. Conferences accept the best pa papers whose aver-
age review value is greater than the acceptance value ac. That is, pa determines
the size of the conference measured in terms of the number of papers accepted.
We also introduce a PC update mechanism in the face of disagreement. The
purpose here is to test a mechanism that could contribute to improvement of
papers quality by removing PC members that disagree with others. While there
is no such mechanism currently in operation - at least openly, because PC for-
mation is left in most cases to the arbitrary decisions of chairs - in the era of
electronic reputation systems, it is not strange to think of ways to make review-
ers, in some sense, accountable.
Thus, after the reviewing process, the conference updates the images i ∈ I
of each reviewer in R, according to the disagreement with the other reviewers of
the same paper. This disagreement is calculated for each paper as the difference
between the review value given by the reviewer and the average review value for
that paper. When this difference gets higher than a disagreement threshold d,
the reviewer disagreement count grows by one; values are recorder in an image
6representation of the form i = 〈r, nd, nr〉, where r is the reviewer, nd is the accu-
mulated number of disagreements and nr is the total number of reviews carried
out. These images are then used to discard the e reviewers with a higher ratio
nd/nr and select e new reviewers from R. This way, conferences perform a selec-
tion process which selects reviewers who provide similar evaluations. Given our
choice for reviewers’ mistakes (if they don’t understand the paper, the evaluation
is random), this mechanism should also select good reviewers.
3 Implementation details
The PR-1 model has been programmed as a MAS over Jason [2], which allows
the definition of BDI agents using an extended version of AgentSpeak(L) [11].
This MAS represents both conferences and reviewers as agents interacting in a
common environment. Thus, the PR-1 MAS can be configured to run different
simulations and evaluate the effects of the parameters in the PR-1 model. For in-
stance, the code in Table 1 shows how to launch a simulation with 10 conferences
and a pool of 500 reviewers.
Table 1. The PR-1 MAS launcher configured for 10 conferences and 500 reviewers.
1 MAS pr_1
2 {
3 infrastructure: Centralised
4
5 environment: env.PeerReviewEnv(10, 500)
6
7 agents: conference #10;
8 reviewer #500;
9
10 aslSourcePath: "asl";
11 }
The reviews carried out by the pool of reviewers can be simply programmed in
AgentSpeak(L) as shown in Table 2. Here, we use the belief skill to set the skill
value associated with each reviewer. As already mentioned, we can change the
distribution of these values through the (α, β) parameters of a beta distribution
(lines 1–3). Each time the reviewer has to review a paper, the +?review test
plan is executed (lines 6–11). Then, the review is accurate with probability S,
and completely random with probability (1− S).
Conferences can be configured through a set of beliefs in the conference.asl
file. Table 3 shows the ontology of beliefs used to set parameters such as: the
number of papers received (n received papers), how many of them can be ac-
cepted (max papers accepted) or the number of discordant reviewers that get
substituted per year (n reviewers exchanged). Additionally, a set of image
beliefs will be managed by each conference in order to represent the images of the
7Table 2. reviewer.asl file defining the reviewer’s behavior.
1 skill(tools.beta(1,1)). // Uniform distribution
2 // skill(tools.beta(2,4)). // Low skill reviewers
3 // skill(tools.beta(0.4,0.4)). // Polarized reviewer skill
4
5 // Plan to review papers
6 +?review(IdPaper, Value, Review) : skill(S) & paper_scale_values(N)
7 <- if (math.random < S)
8 {
9 Review = Value
10 } else {
11 Review = math.floor(math.random(N)) + 1
12 }.
reviewers in the pool. In addition to the previous beliefs, the conference.asl
Table 3. The ontology by the conference agents.
Belief formula Description
n received papers(NP) NP is the amount of papers received by the conference.
reviews x paper(RP) RP is the number of reviews done for each paper.
papers x reviewer(PR) PR is the number of papers reviewed by each reviewer.
max papers accepted(PA) PA is the maximum number of papers the conference accepts.
paper scale values(N) N is the scale of values for the papers.
accept value(AC) AC is minimum value for a paper to be accepted.
image(R, ND, NR) R is the number of the reviewer,
ND is the accumulated number of disagreements, and
NR is the number of reviews done by reviewer R.
disagreement threshold(D) D is the disagreement threshold to punish reviewers.
n reviewers exchanged(E) E is the number of reviewers exchanged each year.
file contains the set of plans dealing with the goals involved in the peer review
system. Table 4 shows some snippets of the plans in this file. For instance, the
plan +!celebrateConference (lines 1–4) first launches the subgoal related
to the reviewing process (!reviewProcess). For each paper received, a num-
ber of RxP reviews are collected (line 11). Then, the conference accepts the
best PA papers (lines 30–34) amongst those exceeding the acceptance value AC
(lines 13–17). The image of the reviewers in the PC is updated according to the
disagreements with the other reviewers of the same paper (lines 19–27). These
new images will be used to satisfy the goal of updating the members of the PC
(!updateReviewers) in line 3.
4 Results
As a proof of concept, in this paper we show what happens in our simplified
model (PR-1) if we change the distribution of reviewers’ abilities. Thus, we
8Table 4. Plan snippets from the conference.asl file.
1 +!celebrateConference(Year)
2 <- !reviewProcess;
3 !updateReviewers;
4 !!celebrateConference(Year + 1).
5
6 +! reviewProcess : n_received_papers(RP) & reviews_x_paper(RxP) &
7 accept_value(AC) & max_papers_accepted(PA) &
8 disagreement_threshold(D) & ...
9 <- for ( .range(PaperId,1,RP) ) {
10 PaperValue = math.floor(math.random(MaxValue)) + 1;
11 for ( .range(I,1, RxP) ) { /* Ask for reviews ... */ }
12 // Evaluate the paper
13 .findall(Review, review(PaperId,_,Review), Reviews);
14 AvgReview = math.average(Reviews);
15 if ( AvgReview > AC ) {
16 +accepted_paper(PaperId, PaperValue, AvgReview);
17 }
18 // Update the image of the reviewers
19 for ( review(PaperId, R, Review) ) {
20 ?image(R, ND, NR);
21 .abolish(image(R,_,_));
22 if ( math.abs(AvgReview - Review) > D ) {
23 +image(R, ND+1, NR+1);
24 } else {
25 +image(R, ND, NR+1);
26 }
27 }
28 }
29 // Limit the number of accepted papers
30 while ( .count(accepted_paper(_,_,_)) > PA ) {
31 .findall(acc_paper(R, PId), acc_paper(PId,_,R), AcceptedPapers);
32 .min(AcceptedPapers, acc_paper(_,PaperIdMin));
33 .abolish(accepted_paper(PaperIdMin,_,_));
34 }.
experiment with different initial probability distributions for the only charac-
teristic of reviewers’ skill, that is, the probability that a reviewer gets his/her
paper right. We consider three cases, that is, uniform ability, low average skill,
and polarized skill4. The shape of the beta distributions that we apply are shown
in Fig. 1.
For this first set of experiments, we have ten conferences (which are essen-
tially the same) receiving 100 submissions each (np), drawn from a uniform
distribution. Papers are assigned an intrinsic value in a 10-values ordered scale,
interpretable as the standard from strong reject to enthusiastically accept scores.
We have fixed pa = 100 and ac = 5.5, so that all papers whose average review
value is greater than 5 are accepted. We have set rp = pr = 3, i.e., the same
number of reviews per paper and per PC member. Thus, a conference will need
as many reviewers as it receives papers. That is, conferences will employ 100 re-
viewers each from a pool of 500 reviewers. There is no limit to PC memberships
4 High average skill is not considered because the uniform distribution already yields
a high quality selection process.
9for an individual reviewer. Ideally, the same group of 100 reviewers could consti-
tute the PC of all ten conferences. Finally, we use a disagreement threshold of 4
(d) and a 10% reviewer turnover rate(e = 10). Substitute reviewers are selected
randomly in the pool.
4.1 Measured quantities
For each set of experiments, we measure several quantities, that we present,
in their time evolution, in the following figures. The results are presented with
five number summary (the central line marks the median, then the successive
quartiles), collecting together the data of the different conferences (that are
equivalent in PR-1) and in a window of five consecutive years.
The average accepted quality is the primary measure of success for the selec-
tion system. Paper quality, if the review process works perfectly, should select 20
top score papers, 20 with quality 9, and 10 of quality 8, leading to an ideal score
of 9.2. The worst possible case (papers are accepted completely at random), as a
reference value, would simply be the mean of scores from one to ten, amounting
to 5.5.
In parallel to the paper selection process, based on disagreement measures
between reviewers, program committees are reorganized with the aim to select
the best reviewers. Thus, another quantity we measure is the average quality of
reviewers that are part of program committees, under different initial conditions
for their distribution. In principle, better reviewers should select better papers.
We also show the number of good papers (i.e., with an intrinsic value greater
than 5.5) rejected, and the number of bad papers (i.e., with an intrinsic value
less than 5.5) accepted. While the previous quantities can be seen as measures
of efficiency, these two can be thought of as measures of fairness.
In fact, good papers rejected and bad papers accepted are especially impor-
tant because of the high-stakes nature of investment that researchers do on each
paper - on the one hand, an “out-of-the-blue” rejection can seriously impact
career, especially in small research groups; on the other hand, the publication of
bogus papers creates a stigma on journals and conferences. Finally, another in-
teresting measure of success for a conference review process had been defined in
[4] as divergence: the normalized distance between the ordering of the accepted
papers, and the ordering induced by another quality measure.
In [4], divergence was calculated with real data of an anonymised “large
conference”, comparing review results against paper citation rates registered
five years later. We perform a similar calculation, not against citation rates but
against our idealized paper quality. The distance used is calculated simply by the
(normalized) number of elements ranked in the top (1/3 or 2/3) by the review
process that are not in the top (1/3 or 2/3) in the ideal quality ordering. The
result for the large conference, that the authors of [4] claim to be disappointingly
comparable to random sorting, is a value of 0.63 at 1/3 and 0.32 at 2/3.
Note how this ordering concerns only the set of accepted papers; good rejected
papers or bad accepted ones do not enter this calculation. This value can be
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considered as another measure of efficiency of the system: the lower it is, the
more efficient the peer review.
4.2 Uniform ability
Here we show the results obtained from a reviewer skill distribution with pa-
rameters (1,1) - a uniform distribution.
From figure 2, we can see how the quality of accepted papers starts already
over the average. The process improves in time for both the paper quality and
reviewer skill; however, only the second has a significant effect. The convergence
process seems to manage selecting good reviewers, but this happens without
a substantial quality improvement. Mistakes in paper evaluations show only a
slight decrease. Finally, divergence from the optimal acceptance ordering remains
constant - perhaps after a slight improvement in the first years. At about 0.28
and 0.2, it remains far better than the levels 0.63 and 0.32 reported in [4].
4.3 Low average skill
Apparently, our simulated reviewers perform better than the real ones. What
if we decrease their average skill, for example drawing them from a beta dis-
tribution with parameters (2.0, 4.0), shown in figure 1 (left)? The results are
presented in figure 3. With such a bad average reviewer skill, the quality of ac-
cepted papers results lower than in the previous case, and the agreement process
yields no or little improvement in time - except in reviewers skill, whose increase
however does not seem enough to improve the quality of accepted papers. There
just aren’t enough good reviewers around to make the process work. Good pa-
pers rejected and bad papers accepted abound, making up for more than half
the body of accepted papers; divergence, ending at 0.6 and 0.25, seems directly
comparable to the values in [4].
4.4 Polarized skill
So fare we have shown a relatively good selection process, starting with reviewers
with uniform distribution, and a relatively bad one, where most reviewers are of
low skill. With yet another shape of the skill distribution, we want to measure
how effective the agreement process is in selecting good reviewers. To this pur-
pose, we choose an initial distribution with a double peak - in this experiment,
as can be seen from figure 1 (right), most reviewers are very bad or very good.
We surely have more than enough good ones for a nearly perfect review process
- but will the system be able to select them? Figure 4 shows this is indeed the
case. This time, the success of the reviewer selection process takes the average
paper quality up with it, obtaining better results than in the uniform case. There
are nearly no bad papers accepted, nor good papers rejected towards the end.
Divergence is similarly affected, leveling at 0.2 and 0.12 at the end.
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Fig. 2. Results (shown as five-number summary) for a beta distribution with param-
eters (1.0, 1.0 ), that is, a uniform distribution, averaged over ten conferences and in
periods of five years. First row, left, average quality of accepted papers; right, quality of
reviewers. Both observable quantities improve substantially in time. Second row, left,
good papers rejected, right, bad papers accepted, both showing a small improvement
in time. Third row, divergence values calculated at 1/3 and 2/3, both decreasing in
time.
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Fig. 3. Results (shown as five-number summary) for a beta distribution with param-
eters (2.0, 4.0 ), averaged over ten conferences and in periods of five years. First row,
left, average quality of accepted papers; right, quality of reviewers. There is no substan-
tial improvement, apart from an increase in reviewers quality. Second row, left, good
papers rejected, right, bad papers accepted, both stable in time. Third row, divergence
values calculated at 1/3 and 2/3.
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Fig. 4. Results (shown as five-number summary) for a beta distribution with param-
eters (0.4, 0.4 ), averaged over ten conferences and in periods of five years. First row,
left, average quality of accepted papers; right, quality of reviewers. Both observable
quantities improve substantially in time. Second row, left, good papers rejected, right,
bad papers accepted. Both show a marked decrease in time. Third row, divergence
values calculated at 1/3 and 2/3, both decreasing in time.
14
5 Discussion and Future work
This paper is a first step towards a model of peer review devoted to study and
to enhance the way of evaluating scientific research. We have sketched the main
elements involved as well as the relations amongst them. A first restricted version
of the full model, that we call PR-1, has been implemented as a MAS over Jason.
The results show how a conference review process based on disagreement control
between reviewers can i) improve in time both the quality of accepted papers and
the reviewer skill of PC members; ii) reduce the number of good papers rejected
and bad papers accepted; and iii) lower the divergence between the ordering of
the accepted papers and an ideal quality ordering. Reviewer selection improves
on both the efficiency and the fairness of the review process. The results, for
what regards a measure of divergence between reviews and actual quality of the
paper, are shown to be qualitatively comparable with the observed data in [4].
Quite a large number of issues still remain open for future work. Limiting PC
memberships for individual reviewers and considering role superposition between
author and reviewer is one of the next steps. Subsequent versions of the PR model
should include the active role of the authors when deciding which conference to
send their works to, as it can vary the distribution of the papers submitted to a
conference. Furthermore, statistical data coming from conference management
systems must be used to validate the results provided by the model.
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